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AMOCO v. ALEXANDER: COMMON LESSEE'S
DUTY TO PROTECT AGAINST FIELD-WIDE




The typical oil and gas lease is a very detailed instrument which,
to the unsophisticated, appears to provide for nearly every imaginable
contingency. It establishes the relationship between lessor and lessee
and defines many of the precise rights and obligations of each party.
Yet, regardless of the number of duties imposed on the lessee by the
terms of the lease, there is always room for a court to add to those
specified duties. This is done by holding that a particular duty, al-
though unspecified, is implied by the standard imposed on all lessees;
the reasonably prudent operator standard.
This process of finding implied duties was utilized by the Texas
Supreme Court in Amoco Production Co. v. AlexanderI where it held
that Amoco (the lessee) had violated its obligation to Alexander (the
lessor) by not protecting against field-wide drainage2 and not seeking
administrative relief from spacing regulations The court emphasized,
however, that-although these two duties had never before been imposed
upon lessees in Texas, 4 they should not be considered additional bur-
dens.' Rather, the court indicated that these duties were merely spe-
cific applications of the previously existing obligation to protect the
leasehold and emanated from the reasonably prudent operator
standard.6
1. 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
2. Id at 568.
3. Id at 570. There was some dispute as to how many leases Alexander had. Amoco Prod.
Co. v. Alexander, 594 S.W.2d 467, 470 (rex. Civ. App. 1979). For the purposes of this Note, it
will be assumed that Alexander held leases on one contiguous tract, and that tract will be referred
to as "Alexander's lease."
4. 622 S.W.2d at 567 ("duty to protect . from field-wide drainage . . . has not been
considered by the Texas courts").
5. Id at 568, 570.
6. Id
1
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II. BACKGROUND
The standard of reasonable prudence is a guiding principle for
resolving disputes between the parties to oil and gas leases. It imposes
on the lessee the obligation to conduct all exploratory, drilling, and
production operations in the same manner aswould a hypothetical rea-
sonably prudent operator under the same facts and circumstances. 7
Implicit in this standard is that a reasonably prudent operator considers
his own interests as well as those of his lessor. Thus, a lessee must
protect the interests of his lessor only to the extent that he can do so
while developing the lease in a profitable manner.8
The standard is intentionally general,9 and encompasses nearly all
aspects of the duties a lessee owes his lessor.'0 As a result, it has gener-
ated many implied duties"I and there is a temptation to compile a list of
these duties as they arise and apply them to every lease. However, this
impulse should be resisted because, while the more general implied
7. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 806.3, at 41 (1980).
8. Profitability as a limitation on the lessee's duty was recognized early in oil and gas lease
jurisprudence. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905) (lessee not obligated
to "carry the operations beyond the point where they will be profitable to him, even if some
benefit to the lessor will result from them"); Colgan v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. 234, 241, 45 A. 119,
121 (1899) (lessee "not bound to work at his own loss for his lessor's profit"). This limitation was
also recognized by the Amoco court, see infra note 64. See generally Williams, Inplied Covenants
for Development and Exploration In Oil and Gas Leases-The Determination of Proftability, 27
KAN. L. REV. 443 (1979) (profitability as the basis for implied covenants).
9. 622 S.W.2d at 568 ("The lessee is required generally to do what a prudent operator would
do.").
10. Id "The reasonably prudent operator concept is an essential part of every implied cove-
nant. Every claim of improper operation by a lessor against a lessee should be tested against the
general duty of the lessee to conduct operations as a reasonably prudent operator. ... Contra,
e.g., Cook v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 560 F.2d 978, 984-85 (10th Cir. 1977) (reasonably prudent
operator rule inapplicable when a common lessee is causing drainage from lessor's tract); Geary v.
Adams Oil & Gas Co., 31 F. Supp. 830, 834-35 (D. I1. 1940) (duty to drill offset wells despite
assumption that to do so "would not have been a prudent operation"); R.R. Bush Oil Co. v.
Beverly-Lincoln Land Co., 158 P.2d 754, 758 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945) (ordinarily prudent opera-
tor standard not applicable to common lessee situation).
I1. The practice of imposing upon lessees duties that had not been specified in the lease is not
a recent development in oil and gas law. In 1926 an entire treatise was written on the topic of
implied covenants. See M. MERRILL, THE LAW RELATING TO COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND
GAS LEASES (1st ed. 1926). As the developing industry confronted new problems, the need arose
to recognize additional lessee duties. For example, it became more common to use geophysical or
seismographic tests to determine the nature of oil and gas deposits. Geophysical or seismic testing
consists of sending sound waves into the earth which, when reflected back to the surface, can be
interpreted to indicate the nature of the underlying strata. One court suggested that a lessee may
actually have a duty to perform these tests. Felmont Oil Corp. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 334
S.W.2d 449, 457 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (lessee's duty to explore could be satisfied by performing
geophysical tests). If this manner of testing for oil and gas deposits becomes the industry's ac-
cepted "best" method of discovery, then exploration may not be complete until geophysical tests
are conducted.
2
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covenants will apply to all leases, many of the specific duties will not,
due to differing fact situations.12 Ultimately, no duty will be imposed
upon the lessee unless it falls within the reasonably prudent operator
standard."3 It is, therefore, more useful to evaluate the validity of a
proposed duty by determining whether it derives from that standard
rather than simply deciding whether some other court has held that
particular duty to exist under a similar set of circumstances.
With the number of duties increasing, it is important to recognize
the difference between a specific duty and a more general obligation.
Unfortunately, the words "duty" and "obligation" are often used inter-
changeably. The distinction to be made is that a duty is a judicial con-
clusion that is derived from a previously established obligation. For
example, a lessee is generally obligated to protect his lessor from loss
due to drainage, 4 but this obligation may be fulfilled in several ways.' 5
It is the function of the court to determine, based on the particular facts
of the case, which of these remedial measures the lessee has a duty to
perform. Thus, a duty imposed upon a lessee is not considered an ad-
ditional burden, but a mere application of the existing obligation. Or,
more general yet, a duty may be considered an application of the rea-
sonably prudent operator standard.
The relationship between duties and obligations has been the sub-
ject of various classification schemes.' 6 While there are some exten-
sively debated differences between the various schemes,17 a basic four-
level hierarchy seems to be common to all. At the top of the hierarchy
is a contract principle rarely dealt with directly in modem oil and gas
law, but which is probably the basis for the guiding standard of reason-
able prudence.' 8 This concept, which applies to all contracts, imposes
12. For example, the Amoco court emphasized that its finding of a duty to seek administra-
tive relief would not have unlimited application: "There may be facts where the prudent operator
would not seek administrative relief." 622 S.W.2d at 570. See also Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Crews,
448 P.2d 840 (Okla. 1968), discussed infra note 57.
13. But see cases cited supra note 10. For a critique of the Cook case, see infra note 63.
14. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
15. For example, a lessee may protect from drainage by drilling offset wells, pooling with
other leases, reworking existing wells, or some combination thereof.
16. See infra note 22.
17. Compare, e.g., Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas
Lease in Texas, 11 TEx. L. REV. 399, 402-06 (1933) (covenants are implied in fact), with, e.g., M.
MERRILL, THE LAW RELATING TO COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES § 220 (2d ed.
1940) (covenants are implied in law).
18. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 802.1, at 8 (1980) ("broad ground on
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on the parties to the contract the duty to cooperate toward the accom-
plishment of the contract's purpose. 19 Immediately beneath this con-
tract principle is the standard of reasonable prudence.20 The third level
in this hierarchy is the implied covenants which are derived from the
objective standard." The implied covenants are:
1. to diligently explore the lease;
2. to diligently drill and develop the lease;
3. to diligently produce and market the oil or gas or both;
4. to protect the lease from drainage.22
The final level in the hierarchy is the specific duties imposed upon les-
sees by court decision based on the particular facts of each case and
derived from the four implied covenants.
Of the four implied covenants listed above, the Amoco case dealt
with the covenant to protect the lease from drainage.23 Due to their
fugacious nature, oil and gas are subject to migration within the reser-
voir. When this migration occurs laterally, away from a particular
lease, that lease is said to be suffering drainage. The implied covenant
to protect against drainage is based on the assumption that both the
lessor and the lessee enter into a lease with the intention of making a
profit. If the oil and gas are subsequently drained from the premises,
19. Id This principle was stated by Judge Cardozo in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,
222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917). In that case, Wood had an exclusive contract to market Lucy's
products. Lucy contended that Wood had not marketed the products with due diligence. Holding
that there was a duty to market the goods with diligence, the court stated: "It is true that [Wood]
does not promise in so many words that he will use reasonable efforts to place [Lucy's] indorse-
ments and market her designs. We think, however, that such a promise is fairly to be implied."
Id at 90-91, 118 N.E. at 214.
20. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
21. In terms of the preceding duty-obligation distinction, the top three levels of the hierarchy
are properly considered obligations. That is, in every oil and gas lease, the lessor is obligated to
diligently work towards achievement of the lease's purpose, to behave as a reasonably prudent
operator, and to do whatever is necessary to fulfill the implied covenants.
22. The number of established implied covenants ranges from three to six, depending upon
which author is consulted. However, the differences are largely organizational rather than sub-
stantive.
This group of four covenants was compiled from the following five publications: R. HEMING-
WAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 8.1, at 365 (1971) (implied covenants to (1) develop; (2) protect;
(3) manage and administer); M. MERRILL, THE LAW RELATING TO COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL
AND GAS LEASES § 4, at 23 (1940) (implied covenants to (1) explore; (2) drill additional wells; (3)
operate and market; (4) protect); 2 W. SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 395 (perm. ed.) (implied
covenants to (1) drill test wells within a reasonable time; (2) drill test wells after notice; (3) de-
velop; (4) protect; (5) market); 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 804, at 26-27
(1980) (implied covenants to (1) drill exploratory wells; (2) protect; (3) develop; (4) explore fur-
ther, (5) market; (6) use reasonable care and due diligence); Walker, The Nature of the Propert.y
Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 11 T.x L. REV. 399, 401 (1933) (implied
covenants to (1) develop; (2) protect; (3) produce and market; (4) use reasonable care).
23. 622 S.W.2d at 567.
[Vol. 17:551
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the purpose of the lease will be precluded and the lessor's rights will be
rendered worthless. The lessor will normally have no cause of action
against the parties to the adjacent lease due to the rule of capture.24
However, since the lessor has surrendered to the lessee the rights to
drill on the tract, the lessee is the only one who can act to protect
against the drainage and is therefore obligated to do so. Typically this
would be done by drilling additional "offset wells" 25 which "capture"
the oil and gas before it is drained away.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
The problem in Amoco -dealt with drainage, but of a type less fre-
quently encountered. "Drainage" usually refers to "local" drainage
but in Amoco, the lessors were complaining of "field-wide" drainage.26
Local drainage is the migration away from a lease which occurs be-
cause a producing well on an adjacent lease lowers the pressure within
the deposit in the vicinity of the well's bore. This lower pressure draws
oil and gas from the surrounding higher-pressure regions, resulting in a
multidirectional migration towards the producing well.27 In contrast,
field-wide drainage is unidirectional and bears no relation to the loca-
tion of producing wells. This so-called "regional migration" is caused
not by a pressure imbalance, as is local drainage, but is due to the geo-
logic characteristics of the deposit as a whole. 28
The deposit underlying the Alexander lease, located in the Has-
tings West Field, was a water-drive field. This is a type of reservoir
containing both oil and water, but because water is heavier, the oil rises
to the top. As oil is removed through wells, water moves in from un-
derneath to displace the oil.29
An additional characteristic of the Hastings West Field was that,
rather than being roughly parallel to the surface plane, it tilted so that
the southeast portion was higher than the northwest portion. Thus, the
24. Under the rule of capture, title to oil and gas belongs to the owner of the mineral rights to
the land from which the oil and gas were extracted, even though the minerals may have been
drained from beneath an adjacent lease. R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 22, § 4.2, at 153.
25. An offset well is "drilled on one tract of land to prevent the drainage of oil or gas to an
adjoining tract of land, on which a well is being drilled or is already in production." 8 H. WIL-
LIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 485 (1981).
26. 622 S.W.2d at 565.
27. 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GA LAW 202-03 (1981).
28. See id at 271.
29. See id at 820.
1982]
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deposit dipped downward to the northwest. Alexander's lease was in
the northwest portion and was referred to as a "downdip" lease. Leases
towards the southeast were the "updip" leases.30
Illustration
The foregoing discussion of the geological circumstances can be




The combination of these two characteristics dictated that as oil
was removed from the field, regardless of well location, incoming water
forced the remaining oil towards the updip leases. 3' This regional mi-
gration toward the southeast resulted in the field-wide drainage of oil
from beneath Alexander's land so that the wells on that lease would
eventually produce only water.
Under simpler circumstances, Amoco, as lessee, would have a
strong incentive to produce from the Alexander lease because oil was
being drained to the southeast by production on the adjacent updip
30. 622 S.W.2d at 565-66.
31. See 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 820 (1981).
[Vol. 17:551
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leases.32 The lease's value was declining with respect to Amoco as well
as to Alexander. However, there were readily apparent reasons why
Amoco began plugging the Alexander wells and refused to drill any
additional wells.
The most significant reason for Amoco's lack of enthusiasm with
the Alexander lease was that Amoco held leases on eighty percent of
the entire Hastings West Field, including most of the updip leases.33
This uniquely advantageous position meant that any oil not recovered
from the Alexander lease would eventually migrate updip towards
Amoco's other leases. Considering Amoco's interest in Hastings West
Field as a whole, it would be economically foolish for Amoco to invest
resources in Alexander's lease when it could recover nearly the same
quantity of oil by developing and producing only on its updip leases.34
Moreover, the Alexander lease provided for royalty payments payable
to Alexander equal to one-sixth of the production, whereas Amoco's
updip leases provided for only one-eighth royalties .3  This additional
economic disincentive contributed to Amoco's reluctance to actively
produce on Alexander's lease.
From Alexander's perspective, the economic realities were much
different. At the time the lease was created, Alexander's land had a
substantial quantity of oil and gas beneath it. It was for the purpose of
realizing those minerals' value that Alexander entered into the lease
agreement. In sharp contrast to Amoco's increased profits on its updip
leases, Alexander's expectation of profit was being destroyed as the oil
and gas were drained away from under his land.
As the production on Alexander's lease began to decline dramati-
cally, Alexander wrote to Amoco requesting immediate corrective
measures.36 In response to Alexander's request, Amoco stated, "We
have reviewed all of our wells for possible corrective work and eco-
nomics do not justify the additional expenditures." 37 Alexander then
32. Exxon, Amoco's major competitor in the region, was producing oil and gas on leases
immediately to the southeast of the Alexander lease. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 594 S.W.2d
467, 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
33. Id
34. The court considered Amoco's advantageous position in making its decision, see infra
note 62.
35. 622 S.W.2d at 566.
36. 594 S.W.2d at 470. The corrective measures requested probably included drilling offset
wells, see supra note 25, reworking the wells, or both. Reworking means, in general, any work on
an existing well intended to secure or increase production. 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL
AND GAS LAW 646-48 (1981).
37. 594 S.W.2d at 470.
1982]
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exercised his remaining option to remedy the drainage problem by
bringing suit in the Texas District Court alleging a violation of the cov-
enant to protect against drainage.
The trial court held that Amoco had violated its duty to protect
against field-wide drainage and, further, that included therein was a
duty to apply for exceptions to the Texas Railroad Commission's spac-
ing rule. Alexander was awarded $3,916,659.00 in actual and exem-
plary damages.38  This judgment was reformed and affirmed by the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals.39
B. Issues Before the Texas Supreme Court
On appeal, the issues before the Texas Supreme Court were funda-
mentally the same as those before the lower courts and were stated in
the opinion:
We must determine whether:
(1) Amoco had a duty to protect from field-wide drainage,
or a duty not to drain the Alexander downdip leases by its
operations updip.
(2) Amoco had a legal duty under the Alexander leases to
apply to the Railroad Commission for permits to drill addi-
tional wells at irregular locations, to obtain the permits and
drill the wells.40
C. Decision of the Texas Supreme Court
Amoco argued that the duty to protect against field-wide drainage
should not be imposed because it amounted to "a new implied obliga-
tion never previously held to exist."4 1 In response to this charge, the
court reiterated the parameters of the reasonably prudent operator
38. Id at 469.
39. The appeals court deducted Alexander's share of occupation tax, reducing the award to
$3,826,077.76. Id at 481.
40. 622 S.W.2d at 566. Note, the second issue would be of no consequence without the find-
ing of a duty to prevent field-wide drainage since seeking administrative relief is merely a refine-
ment of that duty. But Cf R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 22, § 8.1 (duty to seek administrative relief
is derived from the implied covenant to manage and administer the lease).
The court also considered whether the trial court's admission of testimony that the Railroad
Commission would have granted exception permits to allow Amoco to drill additional wells on
the Alexander lease was erroneous and whether the Alexanders were entitled to recover exem-
plary damages. 622 S.W.2d at 566. The court found that the trial court had not erred in admitting
the testimony, but held that a lease is essentially a contract, and exemplary damages were not
available in contract actions. Id at 571.
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standard and found that the duty to prevent field-wide drainage was
within the scope of that standard. Therefore, no additional burden was
being imposed upon Amoco; the court was merely enforcing a specific
duty that emanated from the previously existing obligation.42
Next Amoco argued that the imposition of the duty to protect
against field-wide drainage was "beyond the point of fairness and
workability."43 The unfairness argument was based on the fact that
field-wide drainage is more difficult to prevent than local drainage. In-
deed, the drilling of offset wells does not slow field-wide migration; it
expedites it." Moreover, Amoco argued, offset wells would prompt ad-
jacent lessees to drill additional wells, resulting in even more rapid
field-wide drainage.45
The court recognized that while "protecting from local drainage
may be easier"46 than protecting from field-wide drainage, that did not
excuse Amoco's failure to act as a reasonably prudent operator with
respect to the Alexander lease. Seven ways were listed in which Amoco
might have acted to protect Alexander from drainage.47 The court
again emphasized that it was relying on the basic standard: "The
Court of Civil Appeals has not imposed a new obligation upon Amoco.
The jury, in finding that Amoco failed to operate the Alexander leases
as a reasonably prudent operator, has determined that Amoco failed in
its duties under the implied covenants to protect the leasehold [from
drainage]."4"
Amoco's final attempt to avoid the duty to protect against field-
wide drainage was to argue that such a duty would be in conffict with
the duties it owed to its updip lessors.49 In response, the court recog-
42. Id at 568-69.
43. Id
44. Recall that in an active water-drive field, migration of minerals is instigated by the re-
moval of oil and gas through wells. Therefore, the speed at which the minerals migrate is directly
related to the number of wells drilled into the reservoir, regardless of whether they are drilled
updip or downdip. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
45. 622 S.W.2d at 568.
46. Id
47. The duties of a reasonably prudent operator to protect from field-wide drainage may
include (1) drilling replacement wells, (2) re-working existing wells, (3) drilling addi-
tional wells, (4) seeking field-wide regulatory action, (5) seeking Rule 37 exceptions




49. Id at 569. The court paraphrased Amoco's argument: "If [as part of its duty to protect
Alexander's lease] Amoco fails to maintain or increase updip production, it is exposed to liability
from the updip lessors." Id The court rejected this argument with ease, even while overlooking
1982]
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nized Amoco's predicament as a common lessee,5" but held that a
lessee's obligations to his lessors are not alleviated by having more than
one lessor in the same field." Because Alexander was not a party to the
agreements with the updip lessors, those agreements did not lessen his
rights.
The second part of the duty imposed upon Amoco was to seek
administrative exceptions to the Railroad Commission spacing rules.
Given the geologic situation of Alexander's lease,52 the way to maxi-
mize production would be to drill several wells on the extreme updip
portion. Specifically, Alexander proposed that Amoco drill wells at 200
foot intervals and only 50 feet from the lease boundary.5 3 These wells
would capture most of the oil and gas under Alexander's lease as it
migrated updip. Amoco refused to drill these wells on the basis that
the Railroad Commission rules required 660 feet between wells and
330 feet between any well and the lease boundary.5 4 But the Commis-
sion rules also provided for exceptions to be granted under such cir-
cumstances where it would be necessary to allow shorter distances
between wells in order "to prevent waste or to prevent confiscation of
property."5' 5 Amoco, however, did not attempt to obtain these excep-
tion permits. 6
Because of Amoco's failure to apply for the exception permits, the
the fact that Amoco was reading more ,into the lower court's holding than actually existed. The
trial court had found that Amoco had a duty to protect Alexander's lease, but this ruling carried
no implication that Amoco must decrease production on its updip leases. Amoco's responsibilities
to its updip lessors were, therefore, unaffected by its duties to Alexander.
50. Id A lessee does not usually have much difficulty in complying with the implied cove-
nants because his interests in developing, producing, and marketing oil and gas are the same
interests held by the lessor. However, a common lessee views the field as a whole (as in this case)
which may cause his interests to diverge from those of his lessors. See supra notes 33-35 and
accompanying text.
51. 622 S.W.2d at 569.
52. See illustration supra p. 556.
53. 622 S.W.2d at 569.
54. Id See TEx. R.R. COMM'I RULE 051.02.02.037 (1981). This rule has been amended and
currently requires 1200 feet between wells and 467 feet between the wells and the lease boundary.
55. Tax. R.R. COMM'N RULE 051.02.02.037 (1981). The pertinent language of rule 37
provides:
mhe Commission, in order to prevent waste or to prevent the confiscation of property,
may grant exceptions to permit drilling within shorter distances than above prescribed
when the Commission shall determine that such exceptions are necessary either to pre-
vent waste or to prevent the confiscation of property.
' Id
56. 622 S.W.2d at 569. Amoco could hardly have made a good faith claim that it was either
unaware of the exception provisions or believed that to apply for them would have been fruitless,
Exxon had applied for and obtained rule 37 permits for drilling on the lease immediately updip
from Alexander and Amoco itself had obtained exception permits for drilling on leases further
updip. Id at 570-71.
10
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trial court allowed Alexander to present testimony to the effect that the
permits would have been granted if applications had been made.
Amoco argued that this holding amounted to a duty to seek adminis-
trative relief and that there was no authority in Texas case law to sup-
port such a duty." Although the Texas Supreme Court did not
comment on whether there was any precedent for the duty to seek ad-
ministrative relief, it had no difficulty in upholding the duty. Reiterat-
ing that "Amoco owed the Alexanders the duty to do whatever a
reasonably prudent operator would do," the court held that "an opera-
tor, who fails to act as a reasonably prudent operator by not seeking
[well spacing exception] permits, is liable for loss caused by the failure
to drill the wells.""8 The court stated clearly, however, that this was not
an absolute duty, or a new implied covenant, but was merely a judicial
conclusion based on the particular facts involved.5 9
IV. ANALYSIS
The most noticeable aspect of the Amoco decision is the Texas
Supreme Court's adherence to the reasonably prudent operator stan-
dard. The court found the duties to protect against field-wide drainage
and to seek administrative relief inherent in this objective standard and
57. Id at 569-70. Although Amoco may be correct that there is no Texas decision supporting
a duty to seek administrative relief, the idea is not new to the oil and gas industry or the courts of
other states. Eg., Baldwin v. Kubetz, 148 Cal. App. 2d 937, 307 P.2d 1005 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957)
(duty to seek zoning exception to permit drilling additional wells); Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v.
Bishop, 441 P.2d 436 (Okla. 1968) (duty to seek relief from Corporation Commission to prevent
drainage); R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 22, § 8.10, at 395 (duty to seek favorable administrative
action in aid of the other obligations of the lessee); Merrill, Fufilling Implied Covenant Obligations
Administratively, 9 OKLA. L. REv. 125 (1956) (duty to present to regulatory agencies facts and
arguments to procure orders favorable to interests of lessor); Meyers, The Effect on Implied Cove-
nants of Conservation Laws and Practices, 4 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 463, 486 (1958) (duty to
fulfill implied covenants administratively).
See generally Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Crews, 448 P.2d 840 (Okla. 1968). In this case, the court
stated, "Our determination of the matter herein involved precludes our reaching the question of
whether defendant had an obligation to plaintiffs to comply with an alleged implied covenant [to
seek favorable regulatory action]." Id at 845. The court found that the lessee had reasonably
determined that nothing could be gained by seeking administrative relief, therefore the lessee
should not be penalized for failing to do so. Id at 845-46. The author of this Note suggests that
the Oklahoma Supreme Court could have clarified this case by phrasing the issue as whether the
lessee had a duty to seek administrative relief rather than whether there existed an implied cove-
nant to seek administrative relief. The Sunray court's discussion of whether to create an addi-
tional implied covenant was unnecessary because a duty to seek administrative relief could have
been derived from the existing implied covenant to protect against drainage had the court wanted
to impose such a duty.
58. 622 S.W.2d at 570.
59. Id "We do not agree ... that in every case of field-wide drainage the lessee must seek
[well spacing rule] exceptions."
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emphasized that these duties were merely applications of that stan-
dard.60  This faithful adherence to the reasonably prudent operator
standard is in contrast to the rationale used by the Tenth Circuit in
Cook V. El Paso Natural Gas Co. 61 The Cook decision, like Amoco,
held the common lessee liable for failure to protect against drainage,
despite the fact that drilling offset wells would have been unprofita-
ble.62 Noting that the standard of reasonable prudence limits a lessee's
duties to those which can be performed profitably, the Cook court
reached its result by simply holding the standard inapplicable.63 The
Amoco court demonstrated that it was not necessary to discard the
time-tested standard in order to protect the lessor's rights in an unusual
situation.
In order to reconcile the reasonably prudent operator standard
with the unprofitability of the duty it was imposing on Amoco, the
Texas Supreme Court narrowed its scope to exclude consideration of
Amoco's activities updip. Alexander's rights to be protected from
drainage were properly viewed as independent of Amoco's updip inter-
ests. Alexander entered the agreement with the expectation that
Amoco was bound to protect the leasehold. This right to protection
could not be lessened by leases to which he was not a party. That it
was more profitable to refrain from actively developing Alexander's
lease is not to say it would have been unprofitable to develop it.
It is submitted, therefore, that the profitability limitation on the
standard of reasonable prudence should be imposed only within the
context of the disputed lease. Thus a lessee would not be relieved of his
duty to drill offset wells, for example, unless those wells would not pro-
60. Id at 568-70.
61. 560 F.2d 978 (10th Cir. 1977).
62. Id at 982-84. The Amoco court recognized that it would be economically advantageous
for Amoco to cease operations on the Alexander leases:
The Alexander leases provided for 1/6th royalty while Amoco's updip leases provided
for 1/8th royalty. There is no economic incentive for Amoco to increase production on
the Alexander lease because it will eventually recover the Alexander's oil updip. Money
invested in the Hastings, West Field, will have a longer productive life if invested updip.
622 S.W.2d at 569.
63. 560 F.2d at 982-84. The Cook court held that the reasonably prudent operator standard's
profitability limitation was in conflict with the implied covenant to refrain from depletory acts, see
Seed, infra note 74, and in this case, was subordinated thereto. By rejecting the reasonably pru-
dent operator standard, Cook was, aforiori, rejecting the previously suggested hierarchy. See
supra text accompanying notes 18-22. It has been submitted herein that all implied covenants
emanate from the reasonably prudent operator standard. Thus it is impossible, by definition, that
any one of the covenants be in conflict with the basic standard; the implied covenants are all
branches of the same tree. "The reasonably prudent operator concept is an essential part of every
implied covenant." 622 S.W.2d at 568. The Tenth Circuit's apparent preference for an ad hoc
system of determining duties is unfortunate in that it sacrifices the predictability of the reasonably
prudent operator standard without any discernable justification.
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duce enough to pay for themselves.' It should be no defense for a
common lessee to state that development of a particular tract would be
unprofitable based on his field-wide production plans. Although the
Amoco court did not expressly state this proposition, it clearly and cor-
rectly refused to be influenced by Amoco's overall profits in the re-
gion.65 It is no more fair to defend the degradation of a lessor's rights
based on his lessee's activities updip than on the lessee's operations in
some oil field hundreds of miles away. A lessee is obligated to each one
of his lessors to behave as a reasonably prudent operator, and the
Amoco court recognized that this standard can continue to protect les-
sor's interests, even in the more complex common lessee situations.
By arguing against the imposition of the duties to protect against
field-wide drainage and to seek administrative relief, Amoco was im-
plicitly critical of the court's adherence to the reasonably prudent oper-
ator standard. Amoco claimed that because no Texas court had
previously found a duty to prevent field-wide drainage, such a duty
should not be found in this instance.66 The same argument was used
against the finding of a duty to seek administrative relief.67 But this
reasoning disregards a valuable attribute of the reasonably prudent op-
erator standard-its dynamism. This standard retains its vitality de-
spite changes in technology and industry practice,68 and without regard
to the infinitely varying factual situations of oil and gas leases. 69 For
Amoco to argue that the finding of a particular duty requires a specific
precedent is to contend that the reasonably prudent operator standard
is static. This argument is illogical in view of the process by which
64. Relying on its holding in Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 96-97, 325 S.W.2d 684, 695-96
(1959), theAmoco court stated: "There is no duty unless such an amount of oil can be recovered
to equal the cost of administrative expenses, drilling or re-working and equipping a protection
well, producing and marketing the oil, and yield to the lessee a reasonable expectation ofprofit."
622 S.W.2d at 568 (emphasis added).
Professor Kuntz would modify this proposition somewhat by stating that while an absolute
duty to drill offset wells should not be imposed automatically on common lessees, there are some
situations in which it is appropriate to find a duty to drill an unprofitable well. 5 E. KUNTZ, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 61.1, at 140 (1978). "[I]f a prudent operator would not
drill the [offset] well because it would not be profitable, it is appropriate to inquire into whether or
not the lack of profitability is attributable to the [common] lessee's drainage from the adjoining
tract." Id
65. 622 S.W.2d at 569.
66. Id at 567.
67. Id at 569.
68. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
69. See 622 S.W.2d at 568: "[B]ecause of the complexity of the oil and gas industry and
changes in technology, the courts cannot list each obligation [duty] of a reasonably prudent opera-
tor which may arise. The lessee must perform any act which a reasonably prudent operator would
perform to protect from substantial drainage."
1982]
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duties have been historically imposed.7 0
Another of Amoco's arguments is equally feeble. With the prem-
ise that Alexander was claiming damages due to drainage, Amoco ar-
gued that it should not be required to drill offset wells because these
would not halt but would in fact hasten the drainage.7' While it is true
that additional wells would hasten drainage, this argument overlooks
the purpose of the implied covenant to protect against drainage. The
protection covenant exists to assure that lessors realize the value of oil
and gas beneath their land. In the context of local drainage, this pro-
tection is often achieved through the drilling of offset wells which slow
or halt local drainage. But preventing drainage by drilling offset wells
is only one way ofprotecting against drainage.7z There is no inherent
value to a lessor in preventing drainage except to the extent that pre-
vention may be the best manner of protection. Alexander did not care
how fast the oil was migrating updip. His only concern was that it be
withdrawn before it drained to the adjacent lease. So while it was true
that the additional wells would have hastened the field-wide drainage,
it was also true that those wells would have been the best way for Alex-
ander to realize his interest in the oil and gas beneath his land. There-
fore, Amoco could not validly deny that it was in Alexander's best
interest to increase production on his lease by drilling offset wells.
Although the court reached the correct result, it made its opinion
more confusing by framing the first question as whether "Amoco had a
duty to protect from field-wide drainage, or a duty not to drain the
Alexander downdip leases by its operations updip.""7 But the court
never considered the duty-not-to-drain issue.74 Instead, it focused
70. The faulty logic of Amoco's reasoning can be exposed by summarizing the argument:
1. Finding a duty requires specific precedent.
2. There is no precedent for the duties to protect against field-wide drainage and to
seek administrative relief.
3. Therefore, these duties cannot be imposed upon a lessee.
This argument fails because its basic premise is erroneous. If specific precedent is required in
order to find a duty initially, no duties could ever have been found. Since a number of duties have
been judicially imposed, they must have originated somewhere. Logically, the courts have derived
them from the implied covenants.
71. 622 S.W.2d at 568.
72. A lessee might protect his lessor by either pooling or unitizing the lease with other leases
on the same reservoir. By combining efforts with neighboring lessees, the recovery of marginal
quantities ofoil and gas may become profitable. Seegenerall, 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL
AND GAS LAW §§ 900-999 (1980).
73. 622 S.W.2d at 566.
74. The duty-not-to-drain issue arises when a lessee holds leases on two adjacent tracts of
land and his activity on one lease is draining oil and gas from beneath the other lease. One
commentator believes that this problem calls for an additional implied covenant, Ze., the implied
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solely on whether Amoco had a duty to protect against drainage. In
resolving this issue, the court recognized, but was not influenced by,
Amoco's other activities within the field. The Texas Supreme Court
correctly believed that the lessor's interest could be adequately pro-
tected without imposing a higher standard on common lessees and, in-
deed, without looking beyond the boundaries of the lease.
V. CONCLUSION
Amoco v. Alexander is a case marked by consistent reliance on the
reasonably prudent operator standard as the basis for all implied cove-
nants and duties imposed upon oil and gas lessees. The Texas Supreme
Court held that Amoco had violated its duties to protect against field-
wide drainage and to seek administrative relief from spacing regula-
tions. More significant than the actual finding of these duties was the
process by which they were derived. The Amoco court could have fol-
lowed the Tenth Circuit's Cook v. El Paso rationale by abandoning the
reasonably prudent operator standard and simply creating new duties
on an ad hoc basis. Instead, the supreme court strengthened the stan-
dard and enhanced the predictability of oil and gas law by carefully
tracing these new duties back to the existing implied covenants. Be-
cause this was a common lessee situation, adherence to the reasonably
prudent operator standard was made more difficult due to its emphasis
on profitability. But the Amoco court surmounted this difficulty,
thereby encouraging other courts to be less hasty in abandoning this
versatile standard.
Gregory Noble Fiske
covenant to refrain from depletory acts. Seed, The Implied Covenant in Oil and Gas Leases to
Refrain from Depletory Acts, 3 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 508 (1956). But this additional covenant is only
necessary if the protection covenant is stated as "the implied covenant to drill offset wells." If
instead, this covenant is phrased "the implied covenant to protect against drainage," it would
include protection against so-called depletory acts. See 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND
GAS LAW §§ 824-824.1 (1980) (discussing fraudulent drainage and the higher duty sometimes
imposed upon common lessees).
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